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Effects of main actor, outcome and affect on biased braking speed
judgments
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Abstract
Subjects who judged speed in a driving scenario overestimated how fast they could decelerate when speeding com-
pared to when keeping within the speed limit (Svenson, 2009). The purpose of the present studies were to replicate
studies conducted in Europe with subjects in the U.S., to study the influence of speed unit (kph vs. mph), affective
reactions to outcome (collision) and identity of main actor (driver) on braking speed judgments. The results replicated
the European findings and the outcome affective factor (passing a line/killing a child) and the actor factor (subject/driver
in general) had significant effects on judgments of braking speed. The results were related to psychological theory and
applied implications were discussed.
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1 Introduction
Much of the dynamics of the world we live in can be de-
scribed by statistical and mathematical relationships and
we have to learn them at least approximately to get along.
Sometimes the approximations lead us astray, as demon-
strated by the literature on heuristics and statistical bi-
ases (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002). Even if a
relationship is without uncertainty, as in the case of ex-
ponential growth, approximative and intuitive judgments
may lead to strong biases (McCloy, Byrne & Johnson-
Laird, 2010; Peer, 2010a,b; Svenson, 2008, 2009; Sven-
son, Eriksson & Gonzalez, 2012; Svenson, Erikson, Salo
& Peters, 2011; Wagenaar, 1975). One such relation-
ship describes the deceleration of a car from the point the
driver has realized that she or he has to brake to the point
where the car reaches a complete stop. Figure 1 shows
speed (kph) as a function of distance (m) from the loca-
tion of a car where a driver becomes aware of an obstacle
and starts braking. The different curves describe initial
speeds from 30 kph to 110 kph for a driver-car reaction
time of 1 sec until the brakes start to apply. The friction
coefficient between tires and road surface is 0.8.
The previous studies of this relationship were con-
ducted in Europe, and speed was described in kph. The
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purpose of the first study was to test how general these
results were by replicating them with subjects who mea-
sure speed in mph instead of kph. In the second study,
we asked whether intuitive quantitative judgments based
on the same physical parameters can be influenced by the
outcome of a scenario. Here, we also asked whether the
identity of the main actor in a scenario (the subject, or a
general driver) would influence such judgments.
Svenson and colleagues reported that drivers overes-
timated how quickly they could bring down speed by
braking if they were speeding (e.g., 40 kph) compared
to braking at the speed of the speed limit (e.g., 30 kph)
(Svenson, 2009; Svenson, Eriksson & Gonzalez, 2012).
In their studies, the subjects were instructed that from a
given lower speed (e.g., 30 kph), a driver could stop her
car right in front of a marking or an obstacle in the street
by braking maximally hard. If the car moved faster than
this speed, the driver would not be able to stop at the same
spot. Drivers were asked to imagine that they were driv-
ing faster (e.g., 50 kph compared to 30 kph) and that they
suddenly saw the same line or obstacle at the exact same
place as before at the lower speed and started to brake as
before. At what speed would the car hit the object or pass
the line (Svenson, 2009, Svenson, Eriksson & Gonzalez,
2012)? The problems were presented in instructions com-
municating the following.
The stopping distance increases with higher
driving speed. Imagine yourself driving past a
school with a 30 kph speed limit at a speed of
30 kph when a child unexpectedly runs into the
street. You are an alert driver and start to brake
maximally with a reaction time of 1 second, the
street is dry with good friction and you are able
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to stop just in front of the child. Now imagine
the same scenario, only this time you are speed-
ing and driving past the school at 50 kph. Your
reaction time and conditions are the same as be-
fore, however, as your speed increases so does
your stopping distance, therefore you will not
be able to stop in time and consequently you
will run over the child. Your task is to estimate
the speed at which you will hit the child.
According to normative physics the stopping distance
depends partly on a linear component related to speed
(during the driver’s reaction time before she or he starts
to brake) and partly on a component that is depending on
braking force, friction, and the speed squared (e.g., Carls-
son, 2004). The formulas for calculating the speed from
the time of a stopping signal until a stand still of a car
is the following, in which t0 is the driver’s reaction time
and V stands for speed at a given moment in time t, after
the driver sees a sign or an obstacle and starts to brake.
V = V0 for t < t0 (1)
V = (V 20 − 2gµ(D − V0t0))0.5 for t ≥ t0 (2)
The driver gets the impulse to stop, at speed V0 . The
second part (V 20 −2gµ(D−V0t0))0.5 describes the speed
at distance D from the point where the driver first got a
signal to stop, g is gravity and µ the friction between tires
and the road surface. The stopping distance can be cal-
culated by inserting V = 0 in equation (2). This equa-
tion is valid for a road without any shifts in elevation. A
friction coefficient of µ = 0.8 for hard braking on a dry
asphalt surface describes good braking conditions and it
is reasonable to assume a driver braking reaction time of
at least 1.0 sec in this applied context. According to the
formulas, when driving speed is increased, stopping dis-
tance increases following a nonlinear increasing function
described by equation (1), (2) and Figure 1.
The results from the earlier studies with speeds stated
in kph showed that drivers significantly underestimated
the speed (Svenson, 2009; Svenson, Eriksson & Gonza-
lez, 2012). There may be several reasons for this. First,
the function predicting braking speed is quite complex
and it is therefore hard to approximate even if it was fa-
miliar in a theoretical sense (Svenson, 2009). From a
perspective of driving experience, most drivers who have
exceeded the speed limit have not had accidents when
speeding. Secondly, braking normally takes place rela-
tive to other vehicles or as a reaction to predictable road
characteristics. Also, in the case with unexpected risky
events like the one in the child scenario, it is not easy
to learn by experience as it is not a reoccurring event in
normal everyday driving.
In the first study, we asked whether braking judgments
made by U.S. subjects who are used to express speed in
mph were exposed to the same kind of judgment bias
as Swedish subjects. In order to transform a speed ex-
pressed in miles per hour to kilometers per hour, a value
needs to be multiplied by approximately 1.6. The same
speed is represented by a higher numerical value when
expressed in kph than mph. It is natural to draw a paral-
lel with the money illusion. Speed in mph is a “stronger
speed currency” than kph, which means that smaller num-
bers mean higher physical speeds than the same numbers
in kph. The money illusion describes how, e.g., change
of a currency affects perception and willingness to pay
(Wertenbroch, Soman & Chattopadhyay, 2007). When
prices are given in a new currency and the units are worth
more than in the old currency, the typical effect is accep-
tance of higher prices which are given in smaller numbers
in the new currency. Part of this effect may be explained
by novelty and part by a number magnitude effect.1 In
the present context, only the latter effect applies and pre-
dicts that, because miles per hour is expressed in smaller
numbers than kilometers per hour, subjects’ speed judg-
ments should be higher when expressed in mph (Burson,
Larrick & Lynch, 2009). This was the hypothesis tested
in Study 1.
The outcome of the unsuccessful braking scenario was
varied in the present studies: passing a line or running
over and killing a child. We assume that negative af-
fect is stronger when the outcome is running over a child
than passing a line. This was tested by Svenson, Eriksson
and Gonzalez (2012) in a study of how much affect was
elicited by different versions of the braking and collision
problem scenario. The affect scale they used consisted
of 12 items. Most of the items were taken from differ-
ent scales for measuring affect and emotion (Lubin and
Van Whitlock, 2002; Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Watsen,
Clark & Tellegen, 1988). The items were sad, upsetting,
exciting, scary, awful, shameful, gloomy, contemptuous,
guilty. Three items, despising, repugnant and tense were
added to the set completing the scale of 12 items. The
subjects were asked to indicate how well the different
characteristics described the affective/emotional aspects
of the scenarios on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (ex-
actly). The instruction included the following. “Think
about the scenarios you have just read. To what extent are
the scenarios characterized by the following adjectives?”
For half of the subjects, a child was run over as a conse-
quence of the unsuccessful braking from the higher speed
in the scenarios. The other half of the subjects judged
the same scenarios but no child was involved; instead the
outcome of the unsuccessful braking was simply pass-
1The money illusion was discussed as early as in 1930 by Fisher
(1930) and has been defined in different ways that include, e.g., inflation
and expressions of the same monetary value in different ways. Shafir,
Diamond and Kahneman (1997) defines it in terms of a bias in the as-
sessment of real value induced by nominal representations of equally
valued assets.
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Figure 1: Speed (kph) as a function of distance (m) from the location of a car when a driver becomes aware of an
obstacle and starts braking. The different curves describe initial speeds from 30 kph to 110 kph for a driver-car
reaction time of 1 sec with the friction coefficient between tires and road surface, µ = 0.8.
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ing a marking. The responses to the items of the affect
scale were coded so that higher numbers indicated greater
affect/emotion. Cronbach’s alpha for the 12 item scale
was 0.91. The results indicated that a significantly higher
negative affect/emotion was elicited by the child scenario
compared to the scenario with no such outcome F(1,85) =
38.01, p < 0.000 (Svenson, Eriksson & Gonzalez, 2012).
We hypothesized that the effect of negative affect
would lead to higher judgments of collision speeds. This
hypothesis was based on the assumption that a risk af-
fect reaction will be triggered in the child scenario. The
affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & McGregor,
2004) means that people react positively or negatively to
all aspects of an event or an object via an affective re-
action. This has been demonstrated by subjective judg-
ments of risky events in which the probabilities as well as
the consequences are affected by negative affect (Slovic,
Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000; Rottenstreich & Hsee,
2001). Subjects in the present study should react with
a strong negative affect to the consequence of hitting a
child, and accordingly this leads to a more negative judg-
ment of speed. A more negative judgment of speed means
a higher collision speed and this applies to the child sce-
nario to a greater extent than to the line scenario. This
leads to higher collision speed judgments for the child
condition compared to the line scenario.
We also varied who drove the car in the scenario, the
subject herself or a driver in general. In particular, we
asked whether subjects imagining themselves as drivers
would underestimate the speeds in the same way as sub-
jects who judge a braking episode of another driver in
general.
The hypothesis was that when a subject imagines her-
or himself to be the driver, the response will reflect the
“we are all more safe and more skilled drivers” effect
(Svenson, 1981), which leads to overestimation of one’s
own ability to brake fast for both the collision and passing
line scenarios.
This effect belongs to a class of self-serving biases de-
scribed in the following way. “When people are asked
to evaluate their own abilities, the assessments they pro-
vide tend to be self-serving. Indeed, often the appraisals
that people endorse appear to be favorable to a logically
impossible degree” (Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg,
2002, p. 324). Thus, the present hypothesis predicts that
the speed judgments should be lower for “the subject as
driver” scenarios compared to “driver in general” scenar-
ios. From an applied perspective, such judgments would
underestimate the negative effects of driving fast and in-
dicate that a respondent thinks that she or he can bring
down speed faster than other drivers.
To summarize, in Study 1 we wanted to ask whether
the European study where subjects underestimated brak-
ing speed could be replicated and whether a magnitude
number effect could be found. In the earlier studies, uni-
versity psychology students served as subjects and there-
fore we used this category of subjects in Study 1. (In
Study 2 the subjects were sampled from the general pub-
lic in an attempt to generalize the earlier findings.) We
also wanted to test the hypothesis that the underestima-
tion of collision speed found among drivers using the kph
speed scale also applies to judgments made by drivers
using mph speed measures. Third, we wanted to test
whether the greater affective reaction to the collision sce-
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nario where a child is killed leads to higher or lower speed
judgments than the line scenario if there was a differ-
ence. Furthermore, we tested the hypothesis that, when
a subject her- or himself drives the car in the scenario, the
judged ability to brake fast will be greater than when any
other driver drives the car. This hypothesis predicts that
the judged speeds will be lower when a subject her- or
himself drives than when a driver in general is behind the
wheel.
2 Study 1
2.1 Method
Subjects. A total of 88 persons associated with the Uni-
versity of California Berkeley participated in the study,
86 of whom had a driver’s license. In all, 68 of the
subjects were students of UC Berkeley and the remain-
ing 20 were faculty and staff. A total of 82 reported to
be American citizens. There were 55 (62%) female and
33 (38%) male subjects aged from 18 to 64 years with a
mean age of 24.8 years (SD 10.6). The students signed up
for the study through The Research Participant Program
of UC Berkeley, Department of Psychology, and received
mandatory credits for participating. The remaining sub-
jects participated out of benevolence.
Procedure. The questionnaire was introduced to the
subjects as a set of problems about braking from differ-
ent speeds. The subjects were asked to make intuitive
judgments rather than formal calculations. In addition,
the subjects were asked about sex, age, years of having a
driver’s license, miles of driving per week and year, num-
ber of speeding violations, and if involved in any car ac-
cidents. These variables will be analyzed in a later study.
The problems were solved in a classroom session, and, al-
though the subjects could take the time they needed, they
used approximately 15 minutes for writing down their
personal data and solving the braking problems.
Material. Similarly to the earlier studies by Svenson,
Eriksson and Gonzalez (2012), the subjects were given a
scenario with two different situations concerning braking
from different speeds. The first situation described a suc-
cessful braking effort at a lower speed and, in the second
situation, due to a much higher initial speed, a collision
following an insufficient braking episode was described
and the subjects were asked to estimate the speed at im-
pact. The instruction included the following:
With higher driving speed the stopping dis-
tance increases. Imagine a car driving at a test
track with a speed of 18 mph and that the driver
at a given signal is supposed to stop the car im-
mediately. The driver is alert and starts to brake
maximally with a reaction time of 1 second, the
street is dry with good friction and the car is
able to stop just in front of a white line painted
across the track.
Now imagine the same scenario, only this
time the car is driving at 25 mph. The reac-
tion time and conditions are the same as be-
fore, however, as the speed increases so does
the stopping distance, therefore the driver will
not be able to stop before the line.
Please estimate at what speed the car will
pass the line.
There were a total of 8 similar cases with different
lower and higher speeds listed in Table 1. The speeds of
the cases were the same as in the earlier European studies
(Svenson, Eriksson, & Gonzalez, 2012) only converted to
mph. The subjects were asked to judge the speed of the
car in the second situation when it passed the point where
the car with lower speed was able to come to a complete
stop. The instructions to this task were divided into four
different stimulus conditions in a factorial design. The
conditions were the scenarios with subjects making judg-
ments based on imagining themselves driving or a driver
in general driving, combined with the passing of a line or
running over and killing a child.
Thus, about one fourth of the subjects judged the speed
of a car driven by a driver in general when passing a line
(21 subjects), while one fourth were asked to judge the
speed of a car driven by a driver in general when running
over and killing a child (22 subjects). In the third condi-
tion, subjects were asked to judge their own speed when
passing a line (22 subjects), and the subjects in the last
group were asked to judge their speed when running over
and killing a child (23 subjects).
2.2 Results
First, the differences between subjects’ estimated speeds
(all four stimuli combinations included) were tested
against the correct new speeds. Table 1 gives the lower
and higher speeds, the average estimated speeds for all
conditions, and the correct speeds at collision according
to Equation 1 and 2. Each one of the judged collision
speeds were systematically underestimated. These results
are in congruence with Svenson’s (2009) and Svenson,
Eriksson and Gonzalez’ (2012) findings and show that
these results also apply to braking when speed is given
and judged in mph. When the speeds judged in mph were
compared with the same physical speeds in kph (Svenson,
Eriksson, & Gonzalez, 2012) the mph judgments were all
higher than the Swedish judgments as illustrated in Table
2, but the effect was significant only for increases from
the lowest initial speeds, 18 mph or 30 kph.
To test whether different stimulus conditions would in-
fluence judgments, they were tested against each other
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Table 1: Estimated new speed (mph) after braking from a higher speed (where car with lower speed had come to a
stand still after the same braking pattern for both cars) in Study 1.
Case Lower
speed
Higher
speed
Estimated
speed
Physical
speed Difference
t-value and
significance
1 18 25 11.69 (7.8) 23.38 −11.69 −13.6***
2 25 40 20.13 (8.7) 38.75 −18.62 −19.9***
3 37 81 45.02 (15.7) 81.00 −35.98 −21.4***
4 31 44 18.73 (11.4) 37.83 −19.10 −15.7***
5 50 75 34.15 (19.5) 63.27 −29.12 −14.0***
6 18 31 15.51 (6.3) 31.00 −15.49 −22.9***
7 25 50 26.35 (10.3) 50.00 −23.65 −21.5***
8 25 31 12.68 (9.1) 23.38 −10.70 −11.1***
Note: All entries in the table are expressed in mph. Standard deviations in parentheses.
The physical speed is the correct new speed predicted by equation 1 and 2. Difference
gives the difference between estimated new speed and physical correct new speed.
*** p < 0.001 two-tailed tests.
Table 2: Mean and variance of the mean for U.S. and Swedish sample. Computed pooled variance for both samples in
Study 1.
Case Lower
speed
Higher
speed
Physical
speed Mean U.S.
Variance
mean
Mean
Swedish
Variance
mean
Pooled
variance t-value
1 30 (18) 40 (25) 35.6 (23.4) 18.8 (11.7) 1.84 14.6 (9.1) 1.51 1.70 3.21**
3 60 (37) 130 (81) 130.0 (81.0) 72.4 (45.0) 7.18 71.6 (44.5) 12.67 9.42 0.26 ns
4 50 (31) 70 (44) 59.4 (37.8) 30.1 (18.7) 3.84 29.8 (18.5) 4.45 4.09 0.15 ns
5 80 (50) 120 (75) 101.3 (63.3) 59.9 (37.2) 11.22 56.8 (35.3) 11.90 11.5 0.91 ns
6 30 (18) 50 (31) 50.0 (31.0) 24.9 (15.5) 1.17 21.0 (13.1) 1.79 1.42 3.28**
Note: All entries in the table are expressed in kph. Mph in parentheses. Only 5 of the total of 8 cases in Table 1
were identical with the cases from the Swedish study, thus were eligible for comparison.
** p < 0.01 two-tailed.
with t-tests. Table 3 shows estimated new speeds for sub-
jects’ judgments for the four conditions and the difference
in means between line/child scenario and between your-
self/driver in general scenario. The child scenario gave
higher average judgments of speed in all cases, although
only statistically significant in case 1. When the main ac-
tor was a driver in general, the average judgments in all
eight cases were higher compared to when the driver was
the subject her- or himself. However, the difference was
not statistically significant in any of the cases.
A three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to further
investigate the relationship between the different instruc-
tions and judgments. The first factor was the within-
subjects factor of cases with eight levels. The second fac-
tor was the between-subjects instruction of driver, with
two levels: yourself and a driver in general. The third fac-
tor was the between-subjects instruction of obstacle, with
two levels: crossing a line and running over and killing a
child. None of the you/driver and line/child factors was
statistically significant in this sample of psychology stu-
dents. It is clear that the child and driver scenarios on av-
erage gave systematically higher average judged speeds
of collision. Therefore, this will be the hypothesis to be
tested in the following study using subjects of a general
public sample.
To summarize, (1) the European results were replicated
with mph measures, (2) when the subject was the driver
the judged speeds tended to be lower and (3) when a child
was killed the judged speed tended to be higher. The last
two tentative findings were used as hypotheses in the fol-
lowing study.
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Table 3: Estimated new means for braking distances divided by passing a line and hitting a child instructions and by
subjects self driving and driver in general instructions in Study 1.
Case Mean line Mean child Meandifference t-value Mean you Mean driver
Mean
difference t-value
1 9.61 (6.5) 13.60 (8.4) −3.99 .016* 11.52 (8.7) 11.88 (6.8) −0.36 .832
2 18.35 (9.1) 21.84 (8.2) −3.50 .062 18.60 (8.3) 21.74 (9.1) −3.14 .094
3 43.30 (15.7) 46.67 (15.9) −3.36 .320 44.11 (13.5) 45.98 (18.0) −1.87 .585
4 16.74 (11.5) 20.64 (11.2) −3.90 .110 17.36 (10.9) 20.19 (11.9) −2.83 .248
5 31.42 (18.9) 36.78 (19.9) −5.36 .199 32.40 (19.1) 36.00 (20.1) −3.60 .391
6 14.60 (6.8) 16.38 (5.8) −1.77 .194 14.67 (6.1) 16.39 (6.6) −1.73 .204
7 26.00 (11.9) 26.70 (8.5) −0.70 .752 25.82 (9.9) 29.93 (10.8) −1.11 .619
8 11.14 (8.5) 14.16 (9.5) −3.02 .118 11.38 (8.7) 14.05 (9.3) −2.67 .169
Note: All entries in the table are expressed in mph. Standard deviations in parentheses. Mean difference
gives the difference between the means from the two instructions being compared.
* p < 0.05 two tailed.
3 Study 2
3.1 Method
Subjects. The subjects were recruited from the web panel
of Decision Research in Eugene, Oregon. The members
of the panel come from all parts of the U.S.. When re-
cruiting for the present study, an email was sent to poten-
tial subjects inviting them to participate. A total of 352
subjects accepted the invitation and the mean age of the
subjects was 42.5 years and there were 182 women (52%)
and 170 (48%) men all over 18 years old. They were each
paid $1.50 for their time and effort.
Procedure. To take part in the study, a panel member
could simply click on a link to the study in the email. The
median time spent on doing the survey was 4.5 min. Fol-
lowing the instruction, the problems were presented one
at a time with no possibility to go back to a previous prob-
lem once the answer had been given to a problem. When
a subject had answered a problem, the next problem was
presented automatically.
Material. Subjects were given the same scenarios as
in Study 1, they would either pass a line or hit a child
at the higher speed and it would either be the subjects
themselves driving or a driver in general. The cases were
also the same as in the first study. The design was fac-
torial with an actor (subject as driver/driver in general) x
outcome (child/line) setup. The subjects were randomly
distributed over these four different combinations.
3.2 Results
Two subjects did not respond to two or more problems
and another 21 subjects gave two or more speed judg-
ments exceeding the greater speed, which is physically
impossible. Both these categories of subjects were ex-
cluded leaving 329 subjects for the data analysis. Table
4 shows the average judged braking speeds for different
problems across all conditions. A comparison with the
physically correct speeds in the table shows that braking
speed was overestimated. This replicates earlier findings
of overly optimistic views of how fast the speed of a faster
car can be reduced compared to braking from a lower
speed (Svenson, 2009; Svenson, Eriksson & Gonzalez,
2012).
When the data were divided according to actor and out-
come factors, the pattern in Table 5 emerged. The child
scenarios gave collision speed judgments that were on av-
erage 6.36 mph (30.87–24.51) higher than those for the
line judgments. The actor or driver factor gave colli-
sion speed judgments that were 2.07 (28.90–26.83) mph
higher for the driver in general scenarios. Table 5 gives
individual t-tests for the different scenarios and in order
to assess the overall effects we used a three-way ANOVA
(line/child x you/driver x problem) with repeated mea-
sures on the third factor which gave the following re-
sult. The line/child factor resulted in a significant result
F(1/310) = 28.79, p ≤ 0.0001, and the driver factor was
also significant F(1/310) = 6.91, p≤ 0.009. There was no
significant interaction between these factors.
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Table 4: Average judged speeds and physical speeds when car brakes from higher speed and passes the stopping point
from lower speed (mph) in Study 2.
Lower speed Higher speed
Mean judged
speed
Physical speed Difference t-value
18 25 14.46 (8.0) 23.38 −8.92 −19.7***
25 40 23.59 (10.3 38.75 −15.16 −26.7***
37 81 50.64 (17.5) 81.0 −30.36 −31.4***
31 44 24.80 (13.5) 37.83 −13.03 −17.5***
50 75 44.37 (21.3) 63.27 −18.90 −16.0***
18 31 18.56 (8.0) 31.00 −12.44 −28.2***
25 50 30.08 (10.8) 50.00 −19.92 −33.5***
25 31 17.40 (10.6) 23.38 −5.98 −10.2***
*** p<0.001 two tailed tests
4 Discussion
The present investigation showed that formally identi-
cal hypothetical scenarios only differing in how the actor
and outcome were described lead to significantly differ-
ent speed judgments.
The main finding was that judgments in all conditions
underestimated the remaining speed after braking at a
higher speed compared to a lower speed. To illustrate,
the average judged speed over the 8 problems in Study 2
ranged from 24.51 to 30.87 mph while the correct average
was 43.57 mph. Hence, the underestimation of collision
speed after braking is strong and robust across conditions
and across different units of speed measure. This means
that people have an overly optimistic view of being able
to reduce speed in time when speeding and something
unexpected appears on the road. All problems assumed
close to perfect road conditions with a friction coeffi-
cient, µ = 0.8. If the conditions had been worse like on
a rainy day, the friction would have been lower with µ =
0.4. In this case the physical braking speeds would have
decreased somewhat. To illustrate, speeding and braking
at 40 mph with a speed limit of 25 mph changes the ob-
jective braking speed from 38.8 to 35.2 mph and braking
at 75 mph with a speed limit of 50 mph changes the ob-
jective braking speed from 63.3 to 59.7 mph. The judged
braking speeds in these cases were 23.59 and 44.37 mph
(Table 4) significantly below the correct speeds even for
poor weather conditions. Faster driver-vehicle reaction
time than 1 sec is not realistic in a situation with an un-
expected suddenly appearing obstacle. The standard de-
viations of the speed judgments indicate that, although
the averages were far off the correct values, a minority
(between about 4 and 20%) of the judgments were rea-
sonably close to the correct values. Therefore, it will be
interesting to investigate individual performance differ-
ences in future studies.
In some scenarios, the actor was the subject her- or
himself as opposed to a driver in general and the outcome
of the unsuccessful braking episode was either colliding
with and killing a child or crossing a line. The strong af-
fect child scenarios generated collision speed judgments
that were higher and somewhat closer to the correct brak-
ing speeds than scenarios without strong affect. This sup-
ports the hypothesis that negative affect leads to worse
outcome judgments (higher speed). In scenarios where
the subject imagined her- or himself to be the driver the
speed judgments were lower and further away from the
correct values than when a driver in general was driving,
which supports the “we are all better drivers” hypothesis.
However, as mentioned above, all average judgments of
collision speeds for the different conditions were signif-
icantly smaller than the correct values. This result illus-
trates general unjustified optimism concerning how fast a
speeding car can be slowed down in response to an unex-
pected hazard.
The present research is relevant to debates of speed
limits and attitudes to speed limit and speed limit com-
pliance (Aarts & van Schagen, 2006; Cameron & Elvik,
2010; McCloy, Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2010). Drivers
need to make accurate judgments of stopping distances
in order to appreciate the safe distance to the car in front
or risk of a higher speed. It also deals with intuitive judg-
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Table 5: Average judged speeds and physical speeds when car brakes from higher speed and passes the stopping point
from lower speed (mph) for line- child and you-driver conditions. The correct average braking speed across the 8
problems was 43.57 mph in Study 2.
Low speed High speed Line N=151 Child N=178 Difference You N=150 Driver N=179 Difference
18 25 12.87 (8.9) 15.80 (6.9) −2.93*** 13.49 (7.6) 15.27 (8.3) −1.78*
25 40 20.50 (10.8) 26.22 (9.1) −5.72**** 22.92 (9.8) 24.15 (10.7) −1.23
37 81 46.19 (18.0) 54.37 (16.2) −8.18**** 49.34 (17.5) 51.73 (17.5) −2.39
31 44 20.27 (13.3) 28.65 (12.5) −8.38**** 23.64 (13.8) 25.79 (13.8) −2.15
50 75 38.47 (21,5) 49.42 (19.9) −10.95**** 42.12 (21.6) 46.27 (21.6) −4.15
18 31 16.21 (8.0) 20.55 (7.5) −4.34**** 17.45 (7.9) 19.48 (8.1) −2.03*
25 50 27.21 (11.5) 32.53 (9.5) −5.32**** 29.63 (10.3) 30.45 (11.2) −0.82
25 31 14.73 (10.9) 19.65 (9.9) −4.92**** 16.10 (10.4) 18.49 (10.8) −2.39*
Mean 24.51 30.87 26.83 28.90
* p<0.05, *** p<0.001 two tailed tests.
ments which policy makers, drivers and the general pub-
lic often rely on when forming their opinions about speed
limits. A strong bias in these judgments can affect at-
titudes and opinions, which is especially unfortunate if
it leads policy makers to make decisions which are not
based on correct information or drivers underestimating
the risk of a higher speed. Future studies need to inves-
tigate how we can teach people to make more accurate
judgments of this kind.
Even though the problem of estimating how fast a car
can slow down when braking from a higher speed com-
pared to a lower speed is quite a demanding task (Sven-
son, 2009), there is no reason from rational or internal
judgment consistency perspectives to assume a priori that
the use of the information in a scenario should differ if the
numerical information and the physical conditions are the
same across different problems scenarios. The present
results exemplify how context effects can influence judg-
ments without a normative basis (Hershey, Kunreuther &
Shoemaker, 1988) and that judgments may be inconsis-
tent as a result of variations in actor and outcome con-
texts. Much previous judgment and decision research has
either assumed context invariance or explored different
framings in terms of the verbal labels of the same num-
ber problem as in the Asian disease problem. However,
it seems also important for judgment and decision re-
searchers to study further the influence on human judg-
ment and decision making of scenario outcomes and ac-
tor/observer differences.
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